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COMPARATIVE PARLIAMENTARY STUDIES

Objectives

This course will focus on three aspects of legislative politics in parliamentary democracies: (1) parliamentary constitutions and their consequences, (2) parliamentary institutions, behaviors, and strategies, and (3) cabinet coalition bargaining and governance. On all of the topics covered in this course, we shall draw on recent and ongoing research projects. The seminar is designed for graduate students in political science but is, with the consent of the instructor, open to well-qualified students from other programs. Because this is an interactive seminar, full participation in seminar discussions is expected and required.

Responsibilities and Grades

The seminar will involve a core of required readings. All students should complete these readings before seminar meetings and be prepared to discuss them. You will also post a weekly memo to the seminar participants by the evening of the day before the seminar (Sunday 6:00pm). Your memo should be one paragraph to a page and contain either (i) a critique of some of the readings, (ii) possible discussion questions for the class meeting *and* your (tentative) answers, or, (iii) interesting ways to compare and contrast readings. The memo should not be a summary of readings. During a week when you make a formal presentation, you do not need to submit a memo (see below).

The main written assignment will be a seminar paper (at least 15-20 pp.) on parliamentary politics, due on Tuesday, **March 15**. Topics should be chosen by **January 24**, in consultation with the instructor. You will also be expected to make two seminar presentations: one on a topic related to the course readings (see the list of study questions below) and the other either on your seminar paper project or on a second seminar topic. One of these presentations should be written up as a paper and submitted by **February 14**. The seminar paper will account for 50% of your grade, the presentations 30%, and seminar participation (including memos) 20%. You have to complete all assignments to get credit for the course.

Books and Materials

The following required books have been ordered by the UCSD Bookstore:

Jose Antonio Cheibub, *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 0-521-54244-8.

Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle, *Making and Breaking Governments*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 0-521-43836-5.

Alastair Smith, *Election Timing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Donald D. Searing, *Westminster's World: Understanding Political Roles*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994. 0-674-95072-0.

Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman, eds., *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 978-0-19-829786-4.

Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman, eds., *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Paperback edition 2006. 0-19-929160-8.

Other readings may be assigned and made available. Details will be discussed during the first class meeting. All readings listed below are required.

COURSE OUTLINE AND READINGS

Week 1 (January 3): **What is Parliamentary Democracy?**

Readings:

Arend Lijphart, ed., *Parliamentary versus Presidential Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, Introduction (pp. 1-27).
 Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999, ch. 7.
 Strøm, Müller and Bergman (2003), chs. 1 and 3.
 Cheibub (2007), ch. 2.

Week 2 (January 10): **Parliamentary Structure and Process**

Readings:

Gary W. Cox, *The Efficient Secret*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, ch. 6.
 Herbert Döring, ed., *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, chs. 7, 10, and 14-15.
 John D. Huber, *Rationalizing Parliament*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, chs. 2, 4-5.
 George Tsebelis and Jeannette Money. *Bicameralism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, chs. 1-4, and 9 (except appendices).
 Lanny W. Martin and Georg Vanberg, "Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review." *American Political Science Review* 99, 1 (February 2005), 93-106.

Study Questions:

1. What purposes do restrictive procedures serve in parliamentary democracies?
2. How do parliamentarians seek to overcome their lack of policy information relative to the executive branch?
3. Who rules parliament: Presiding officers, party leaders, the prime minister, or the citizens?

Week 4 (January 24): **Parliamentary Elections and Political Parties**

Readings:

Cheibub (2007), ch. 5.
 Mark Hallerberg, "Electoral Laws, Government, and Parliament." In Herbert Döring and Mark Hallerbert, eds., *Patterns of Parliamentary Behavior*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004, ch. 1.
 Simon Hix, "Parliamentary Behavior with Two Principals: Preferences, Parties and Voting in the European Parliament." *American Journal of Political Science* 46, 3 (July 2002), 688-98.
 David J. Samuels and Matthew S. Shugart, *Presidents, Parties and Prime Ministers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, chs. 1-5.
 Alastair Smith, *Election Timing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, chs. 1-3 and 5.
 Kaare Strøm and Stephen M. Swindle, "Strategic Parliamentary Dissolution." *American Political Science Review* 96, 3 (September 2002), pp. 575-91.
 Strøm, Müller and Bergman (2003), ch. 22.
 Strøm, Müller and Bergman (2008), ch. 11.

Study Questions:

1. Is the parliamentary dissolution power the reason that parliamentary democracies are so stable?
2. Can incumbent parties in parliamentary systems fool the voters all of the time, some of the time, or none of the time?
3. Are PR elections the cause of multiparty systems, or are multiparty systems the cause of PR?

Paper Topics Due

Week 5 (January 31): **Parties, Voters, and Parliamentarians**

Readings:

Johanna K. Birnir, "Where are the Disgruntled Voters? Voter-Party Relations under Cartelizing Conditions." *Party Politics* 16, 1 (January 2010), 29-49.
 Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., *Parties without Partisans*. Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2000, ch. 12.

Döring, ch. 5 (Andeweg and Nijzink).

Christopher Kam, William T. Bianco, Itai Sened, and Regina Smyth, "Ministerial Selection and Intraparty Organization in the Contemporary British Parliament." *American Political Science Review* 104, 2 (May 2010), 289-306.

Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization: The Emergence of the Cartel Party." *Party Politics* 1, 1 (January 1995), 1-28.

Herbert P. Kitschelt, "Citizens, Politicians, and Party Cartelization: Political Representation and State Failure in Postindustrial Democracies." *European Journal of Political Research* 37, 2 (March 2000), 149-179.

Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm, eds., *Policy, Office, or Votes?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, ch. 1.

Donald Searing, *Westminster's World*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994, chs. 1-2, 6-10.

Study Questions:

1. Which matters most to the quality of parliamentarians: the demands of selectors or the supply of candidates?
2. To what extent and how does the pursuit of office shape parliamentary behaviors?
3. Do parliamentarians choose their roles?
4. The cartel party: a European peculiarity, a wave of the future, or a figment of the imagination?
5. Does the policy influence differential between government and opposition matter, and if so, how?
6. Why do citizens distrust political parties?

Week 6 (February 7): Multiparty Parliamentary Politics and Coalition Bargaining

Readings:

David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks, "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," *American Political Science Review* 82, 2 (June 1988), 405-422.

Laver and Shepsle (1996), chs. 1-5, 8-9, and 13.

Kaare Strøm, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, ch. 3.

Strøm, Müller and Bergman (2008), chs. 1-2, 4, and 6.

George Tsebelis, *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002, chs. 1 and 4.

Paul V. Warwick, "Ministerial Autonomy or Ministerial Accommodation? Contested Bases of Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies," *British Journal of Political Science* 29 (1999): 369-394.

Study Questions:

1. Was Riker right after all: Is the desire to avoid unnecessary "passengers" the most important force in coalition bargaining?
2. Are pre-electoral agreements the key to coalition bargaining?
3. To what extent does cabinet structure dictate coalition membership, and to what extent does coalition membership dictate cabinet structure?

Week 7 (February 14): Coalition Bargaining II: Governance and Portfolio Allocation

Readings:

Shaun Bowler, David M. Farrell, and Richard S. Katz, eds., *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government*. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1999, ch. 12 (Mitchell).

Royce Carroll and Gary W. Cox, "The Logic of Gamson's Law: Pre-election Coalitions and Portfolio Allocations." *American Journal of Political Science* 51, 2 (April 2007), 251-65.

John D. Huber and Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo, "Replacing Cabinet Ministers: Patterns of Ministerial Stability in Parliamentary Democracy." *American Political Science Review* 102, 2 (May 2008), 169-80.

Strøm, Müller and Bergman (2008), chs. 5, 7-10.

Daniel Diermeier and Randolph T. Stevenson, "Coalition Terminations and Critical Events." *American Political Science Review* 94, 3 (September 2000), 627-40.

Arthur W. Lupia and Kaare Strøm, "Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections." *American Political Science Review* 89, 3 (September 1995), 648-65.
 Petra Schleiter and Edward Morgan-Jones, "Constitutional Power and Competing Risks." *American Political Science Review* 103, 3 (August 2009), 496-512.

Study Questions:

1. What powers do cabinet members have, and how does it matter?
2. Which is the greater threat in executive appointments: adverse selection or moral hazard?
3. Does the parity norm disprove rational choice theories of coalition bargaining?
4. Does cabinet stability matter?
5. The suspicious deaths of parliamentary cabinets: Do they jump or are they pushed?
6. What makes critical events in coalition politics critical, and how critical are they?

Papers Due**Week 9 (February 28): Policy Performance****Readings:**

Kathleen Bawn and Frances Rosenbluth, "Electoral Accountability and the Size of the Public Sector." *American Journal of Political Science* 50, 2 (April 2006), 251-65.
 Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, "The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes." In Mathew D. McCubbins and Stephan Haggard, eds., *Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
 Fabio Franchino and Bjørn Høyland, "Legislative Involvement in Parliamentary Systems: Opportunities, Conflict, and Institutional Constraints." *American Political Science Review* 103, 4 (November 2009), 607-21.
 Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, *The Economic Effects of Constitutions*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005, chs. 1-2, 6-7, and 9.
 Samuels and Shugart, ch. 8.
 Strøm, Müller and Bergman (2003), ch. 23.
 Joachim Wehner, "Cabinet Structure and Fiscal Policy Outcomes." *European Journal of Political Research* 49, 5 (August 2010), 631-53.

Study Questions:

1. Does parliamentary democracy enhance the production of public goods, the creation of rents, neither, or both?
2. What matters most to policy performance: regime type, cabinet type, or electoral system?
3. Have the parliamentary mechanisms of citizen control lost their edge?

Week 10 (March 7): Parliamentarism, Presidentialism, and Democratic Stability**Readings:**

Cheibub (2007), ch. 6.
 Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, chs. 1(Linz) and 3 (Sartori).
 Samuels and Shugart, ch. 9.
 Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, chs. 1 and 3.
 Tsebelis (2002), ch. 3.

Study Questions:

1. Is the relationship between regime type and democratic stability spurious?
2. Is the semi-presidential regime type more presidential than parliamentary?
3. Is the failure of presidential democracy a failure of Latin American politics, a failure of military intervention, a failure of presidential leadership selection, or none of the above?

March 15:**Seminar Papers Due**